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1 Introduction 
1.1 Goal of the Workshop 
 
To present and discuss the developed methods and approaches and the results 
obtained for application of reliability and PSA techniques on evaluation and 
management of NPP ageing.  
 
1.2 General Context 
 
In countries with nuclear industry are carrying out various programs for managing 
material degradation of NPP structures, systems and components (SSC) and for 
related topics such as Long Term Operation (LTO) and Plant Life Management 
(PLiM). International exchange on these activities or international programs related to 
these topics have been initiated through the IAEA, the OECD-NEA and through 
projects partly sponsored by the European Commission (EC) in the EU.  
 
In order to facilitate the analysis of power plant performance, many organizations 
have initiated efforts to collect data about nuclear power plants. IAEA has started the 
activity of data collection in 1970, and the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) 
was implemented. PRIS constitutes now the most complete data bank on nuclear 
power reactors in the world and is being used as an essential source of information on 
nuclear power. 
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Figure 1: Ageing profile of nuclear operating reactors 
 
According to PRIS statistics (PRIS, 2011), currently are 440 nuclear power reactors in 
operation in 30 countries, with a total net installed capacity of 374.093 GW(e). These 
plants, which have an average age greater than 20 years, were initially licensed to 
operate for 30 to 40 years. In order to meet the growing global demand for electricity, 
particularly to support economic development, it is projected that about 2300 GW(e) of 
new generating capacity would need to be built over the next 20-30 years. Since the 
costs for such projects will be significant and since the recent economic downturn 
might delay or even cancel many of these projects, the extension of the service life of 
existing NPP beyond their design lifetime becomes an extremely interesting issue. 
More and more utilities, nowadays, take into consideration the long-term operation 
policy.  
 
IAEA PRIS data concerning aging profile of nuclear generation shows that more than 
81% of operational reactors have more than 20 years of operation, which means that 
in the next decade ageing management and long term operation issues will became 
one of the key points of nuclear safety, and the evaluation of ageing effects on the 
overall plant safety will become a necessity. The fact that the ageing phenomena 
have certain effects on equipment is a non-arguable fact, and as the time is passing, 
is very likely that the component performances will be degraded. 
  
For the units which have approached the end of initial design lifetime and especially 
for those which are planning to extend the lifetime, it has to be demonstrated that the 
plant safety level will remain adequate until the end of operation, and to do that, is 
necessary to evaluate the effects of ageing phenomena on the plant performance and 
safety. 
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The activities related to ageing evaluation are usually performed in the frame of the 
following programs: 
 
 Periodic Safety Review, 
 Ageing Management, 
 Maintenance Optimization, 
 Long Term Operation. 
 
In the last years, the PSA tools have reached a certain level of development and their 
results were increasingly being used as an integral part of the safety related decision 
making process. It was demonstrated that PSA results can bring important issues to 
successfully complement deterministic analysis. 
  
PSA studies could be used as a safety evaluation tool, to help with identification and 
prioritization of ageing issues and optimization of ageing management activities.  For 
applying PSA to characterize potential risks associated with ageing effects, PSA 
should be as realistic as practical, and appropriate support data should be available. 
The requirement to accomplish the safety goals during the whole lifecycle of the 
nuclear installations (including the extended lifetime) sustained the idea of using the 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for ageing evaluation. Also, together with 
maintaining the established safety goals, it was recognized the necessity of 
prioritization of the Ageing Management or Long Term Operation actions, and the 
results of PSA could be used successfully for this task. 
 
Use the PSA models for risk-informed decision making in case of ageing evaluation 
demand solving of many issues, e.g. how realistically are taken into account ageing 
issues in PSA models, what data are available for analysis, how representative they 
are with regards to the ageing assessment, and if any modifications or revisions of 
PSA assumptions are needed and how they could be managed. 
 
1.3 Ageing PSA Projects 
 
The motivation for initiating the JRC Institute of Energy project “Use of PSA for 
Evaluation of Ageing Effects” (APSA), was the fact that current standard PSA tools do 
not adequately address important ageing issues, which could have a significant 
impact on the conclusions made from PSA studies and applications, especially in 
case of plants operating in advanced aged conditions or in LTO conditions. By 
analyzing the standard PSA and the demands of performing age evaluations, the 
main characteristics for the APSA model were drawn as follows: 
 
 APSA model should explicitly models ageing effects in component failure rates, 
which generally cause the failure rates to increase with age ( the classic PSA use 
the assumption that component failure rates are constant). 
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 APSA model should explicitly calculate the ageing effects and age dependence on 
the core damage frequency and systems unavailability (the classic PSA calculates 
constant values for the core damage frequency and systems unavailability). 
 APSA model should explicitly model the effects of test and maintenances in 
controlling the ageing of components.  
 Standard PSA neglects the components that have small failure probabilities, not 
taken into account the fact that these probabilities could suffer dramatic changes 
in time (this reflects the situation of passive components); in APSA model these 
components are taken into account. 
 
1.3.1  Objective of the APSA Project 
 
The JRC IE project has established the bases for Ageing Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (APSA) Network. Main objective of the APSA Network is to use common 
resources of Network participants for identification, development and demonstration of 
methods and approaches which could help PSA developers and users in the following 
activities:  
 
 to investigate and to evaluate the effects that ageing phenomena could induce on 
the plant performance, 
 to incorporate the effects of ageing on equipments into current PSA models, 
 to provide the necessary support for identification and prioritization of reliability 
monitoring actions / approaches to assure that potential decreasing of reliability of 
SSC would be identified and corrected in time and 
 to promote the use of PSA for ageing management and risk-informed applications 
in LTO. 
 
APSA model can be used as a demonstration of current safety level (monitoring) and/ 
or evaluation of risk profile for prioritization of ageing issues (using predictive 
extrapolation). The main issues of Ageing PSA development are related to the 
following: 
 
 identification of appropriate data sources for performing ageing analysis, 
 review of initiating events frequencies, considering the ageing effect, 
 modelling the ageing impact on Common Case Failures (CCF) probabilities, 
 reliability data analysis and parameters estimation for aged active components, 
 application of physical reliability models for aged passive components, 
 modification/ adaptation of computer codes for APSA applications, 
 qualitative/ quantitative assessment of ageing impact, 
 predictive extrapolations (including sensitivity and uncertainty analysis), 
 application of the results in risk informed decision making processes. 
 
 5 
1.3.2  Participants of the Workshop 
 
The workshop was mainly addressed to the professionals from the EU new member 
states and candidate countries, as well as non EU Countries as Armenia, Ukraine and 
Russia. The workshop participants came from the following countries or international/ 
European Organizations: IAEA, EC JRC, Switzerland, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Republic of Armenia, France, Russian Federation, USA, Lithuania, Republic 
of South Africa and Germany. There was a large variety in organization types, 
including utilities, safety authorities, support organizations and research institutes, 
providing a large variety in the presentations. 
 
2 Workshop Summary 
 
JRC – IET Petten organized with the support of the Gösgen-Däniken NPP, 
Switzerland, an EC Workshop on Investigation of Ageing Effects using the 
Probabilistic Safety Assessments. The workshop took place at Gösgen-Däniken NPP, 
Switzerland, and was dedicated to applications of reliability and PSA techniques on 
evaluation and management of NPP ageing. 
  
At the beginning of the workshop, M. Nitoi welcomed the participants and presented 
the agenda of the meeting.  She thanked Gösgen-Däniken NPP representatives for 
their support in organizing the event and wished for all participants a successful 
meeting. After a round table presentation of the participants, including specification of 
their organization and their field of expertise, as their activities related to PSA and 
AM/LTO, the sessions of the workshop were started. 
  
The workshop contained a general session, dedicated to activities of different 
organizations in PSA field, and a technical session, focused on the results obtained in 
application of reliability and PSA techniques on evaluation and management of NPP 
ageing. 
 
2.1 Workshop Presentations 
 
“Welcome at the plant site. Introduction of Gösgen-Däniken NPP activities” paper was 
presented by J. Klügel on behalf of Gösgen-Däniken NPP General Plant Manager. J. 
Kluegel, as the host of the workshop, gave a welcoming presentation. The 
presentation started with information about Switzerland plants (type of reactor, power 
output, commercial operation date), specific information about the Gösgen-Däniken 
NPP and about developed PSA studies (scope of studies and PSA applications 
implemented at Gösgen-Däniken NPP). The date of commercial operation (1979) for 
Gösgen-Däniken NPP classifies the plant in the generation of mid-age plants. 
Important dates were also specified, as the date for first project study (1966), site 
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license (1972), foundation of company (1973),  and start of commercial operation date 
(despite the accident of TMI 2) –  in 1979. The Gösgen-Däniken NPP is a nuclear unit 
with a PWR reactor (vendor: Siemens/KWU), with Gross Nominal Electrical Power 
Output of 1035 MWe. The plant has 472 employees. As a result of really good 
operation experience, the last Reactor Scram was in 11.12.1990. 
 
PSA results are used in many applications, as the following: safety evaluation (as 
traditional application of PSA results), operational incident analysis, system of 
Probabilistic Safety Indicators, and financial risk analysis. The safety evaluation of the 
plant include support of plant upgrades, evaluation of plant modifications, evaluation 
of outage times AOT. Operational incident analysis include precursor analysis, 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, classification of events, and drawing 
annual risk profile that use offline risk monitor applications. PSA results are used to 
classify events (CCDP>10-8/a = INES0, >10-6/a =INES 1). The system of probabilistic 
safety indicators deals with risk peaks – max. CCDP, annual cumulative CCDP, 
unavailability on demand- combination of availability and reliability, management 
performance assessment system. Financial risk analysis includes use of PSA results 
for estimation of technical risks. In this analysis, PSA reliability data and data of 
initiating events are used as input for the evaluation of technical risks and associated 
financial consequences.  
 
The steps of developing PSA were also specified, as follows: 
 
 1990-1994 – First PSA Project, Level1/ Level2 for power operation (internal 
initiating events, internal and external hazards); Level1+ for shutdown operational 
modes 
 1997 – Update of shutdown model ( new third independent spent fuel pool cooling 
train) 
 2001 Update of seismic PSA 
 2003 Update/Upgrade of PSA model. Living PSA model 
 2004/2005 – International PSA Peer Review (Industry level) of level 1 PSA for 
power operation 
 2005 Update of shutdown PSA, update of seismic PSA 
 2008 Update/Upgrade of PSA – part of periodic safety review 
 
After presentation, it was concluded that PSA results are intensively used at the plant, 
and some of the applications performed could be used as successful examples for 
other plants. 
 
 
“Overview of IAEA Activities and Recent Publications Relating to Safety Assessment” 
paper was presented by M. Nitoi on behalf of Irina Kuzmina. The presentation had as 
goal to provide information on the activities being conducted by the Division of 
Nuclear Installation Safety (NSNI) in the area of nuclear safety and to provide 
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information on significant recent publications on safety assessment including PSA and 
SAM. The mission of NSNI was specified as follows: 
 
 to enhance the global nuclear safety regime and to ensure appropriate levels of 
safety throughout the total lifetime of all types of nuclear installations in EU MS by 
ensuring the availability of a consistent, needs-based and up to date set of safety 
standards, and assistance in their applications; 
 to enable MS seeking to embark on nuclear power production programmes to 
develop appropriate safety infrastructures through the availability of IAEA 
guidance, assistance and networking; 
 to enable MS to build improved competence frameworks for the safety of nuclear 
installations and to enhance their capabilities for capacity building as the 
foundation for strong safety infrastructure 
 
For the safety review service, it was presented the core services provided, area for 
services and an overview of the activities in this area of NSNI. The generic reactor 
safety reviews performed by IAEA were specified also, as below: 
 
 GRSR Projects - conducted in 2007- 2009 
 UK HSE - Screening of Four New Reactor Safety Cases submitted for the 
consideration of the UK Health and Safety Executive/NII against GSR-4:  
ACR1000, AP1000, ESBWR, EPR 
 ATMEA1 - Screening of Conceptual Design Safety File and its innovative features 
against GSR-4 and NS-R-1 of new AREVA-MHI Reactor ATMEA1  
 AP1000 - Screening of AP1000 Safety and Environmental Report and its 
innovative features against GSR-4 and NS-R-1 
 APR1400 - Screening of KHNP APR1400 Safety and Environmental Report 
against GSR-4 and NS-R-1 
 
The goals for review of accident management programme (RAMP) service provided 
by IAEA were presented as follows: 
 
 to provide advice and assistance at the utility/ nuclear power plant (NPP) level 
in effective plant specific Accident Management Programme (AMP) 
preparation, development and implementation. 
 to conduct peer review by teams with selected independent international 
experts. 
 
RAMP has the following specific objectives: 
 
 to explain to licensee personnel principles and possible approaches in effective 
implementation of AMP;  
 to perform an objective assessment of the status in various phases of AMP 
implementation; 
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 to provide licensee with suggestions and assistance for improvements of AMP. 
 
It was specified that RAMP can be performed with the following options: 
 
 Seminar on AMP (PRE-RAMP), with the aim to introduce and educate on the 
basic components of AMP development; 
 Review of accident analysis for accident management (RAAAM), having the aim to 
review the completeness and quality of accident analysis covering BDBA and 
severe accidents; 
 Review of AMP (RAMP), with the aim to review the quality, consistency and 
completeness of AMP 
 
Area and scope of RAMP were detailed, as follows: selection and definition of AMP, 
accident analysis for AMP, assessment of plant vulnerabilities, development of severe 
accident management strategies, evaluation of plant equipment and instrumentation, 
development of procedures and guidelines, verification and validation of procedures 
and guidelines, integration of AMP and plant emergency arrangements, staffing and 
qualification, training needs and training performance, AMP revisions. It was 
highlighted that safety assessment competence is the key to making the right 
decisions in design, operation and licensing. Safety assessment education and 
training programme (SAET) is a three step process, containing formulation of 
knowledge requirements, development of training programmes and maintenance or 
improving of knowledge/ skills. 
 
Safety guides on PSA have as objective to provide recommendations for performing 
or managing a PSA project for an NPP and using it to support the safe plant design 
and operation. The recommendations aim to provide technical consistency of PSA 
studies to reliably support PSA applications and risk-informed decisions. An additional 
aim is to promote a standard framework that can facilitate a regulatory or external 
peer review of a PSA and its various applications. The scope of SG covers all plant 
operational conditions (full power, low power and shutdown), and all potential initiating 
events and hazards, i.e.: 
  
a) internal initiating events caused by random component failures and human errors; 
b) internal hazards (e.g. internal fires and floods, turbine missiles, etc.); 
c) external hazards, both natural (e.g. earthquake, high winds, external floods, etc.) 
and man-made (e.g. airplane crash, accidents at nearby industrial facilities, etc.). 
 
As radioactivity source is considered the reactor core. The SG is intended primarily for 
use by operating organizations of NPP, utilities and their support organizations, but 
may also be used by regulatory bodies to facilitate preparation of the relevant national 
regulatory requirements. 
 9 
Applications of PSA level 1 results has a dedicated chapter in safety guide – chapter 
10 – that provides the key recommendations for a number of Level-1 PSA 
applications. The following applications are covered: 
 
 Use of the PSA for design evaluation, 
 Risk informed technical specifications, 
 Risk monitors, 
 Risk informed in-service inspection,  
 Risk informed in-service testing, 
 Graded quality assurance,  
 PSA-based safety performance indicators,  
 PSA-based event analysis, 
 Risk informed regulation. 
 
SG on deterministic safety analysis has as objectives to provide recommendations 
and guidance on deterministic safety analysis for designers, operators, regulators and 
technical support organizations. The deterministic safety analysis could be used in: 
  
a) Demonstrating or assessing compliance with regulatory requirements; 
b) Identifying possible enhancements of safety and reliability; 
c) Obtaining increased operational flexibility within safety limits for nuclear power 
plants. 
 
SG on SAM programmes has as objectives to provide recommendations on meeting 
the requirements for accident management, including managing severe accidents and 
to provide recommendations for the development and implementation of an accident 
management program. TECDOC1511 has as objective to provide information 
regarding the technical features (termed “attributes”) of major PSA elements (IE, AS, 
HR, etc.) which are appropriate for carrying out various applications, including a ‘Base 
Case PSA’. The document covers Level 1 PSA applications, at nominal power, 
considering only internal initiating events. External hazards like earthquakes, 
tornadoes, and other natural and man-induced hazards are not included. The 
shutdown and low power operation modes are out of the scope of the report. General 
(a minimum set of the attributes needed to perform a state-of-the-art PSA with the aim 
to assess the overall plant safety, or a typical “Base Case PSA”) and special attributes 
(they provide enhanced capabilities supporting certain applications of a PSA) were 
specified for each application. It was specified that the general attributes are 
applicable to all PSA applications. The document contains a MATRIX mapping the 
special attributes to PSA applications. The categories of PSA applications were 
presented, each of them with their purpose and the procedure to be followed to 
achieve the adequate quality. 
  
The documents issued by IAEA are expected to support the use of PSA in various 
applications and planning of a PSA project, making sure that appropriate PSA quality 
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is achieved, or assessing the applicability of an existing PSA for use in an application. 
It is expected that the TECDOC 1511 will serve as a complementary technical 
reference for PSA-related services and review missions being conducted by the IAEA 
on request of the Member States. 
 
Other IAEA publications were also presented, all aimed at improving the quality of the 
PSA, so that they could support decision making efficiently and reliably. The list 
included: IAEA-TECDOC-1101 on “Framework for a quality assurance programme for 
probabilistic safety assessment”, IAEA-TECDOC-1106 on “Living probabilistic safety 
assessment (LPSA)”, IAEA-TECDOC-1135 on “Regulatory review of PSA Level 1” 
and IAEA-TECDOC-1229 on “Regulatory review of PSA Level 2” developed jointly 
with OECD/ NEA. It was specified the fact that all documents are available free of 
charge in PDF-form at the IAEA publications web-page. 
 
It was concluded that IAEA Safety Standards provide an internationally agreed 
platform for NPP safety considerations and that Safety Review Services is an effective 
tool for promoting the Safety Standards application. TECDOC-1511 provides in a well 
structured way useful information on PSA features for applications. Also it was 
highlighted the fact that GRSR – review of safety cases for new NPP designs on the 
basis of Safety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements is promoting the 
harmonization of safety approaches and possibly licensing activities of Member 
States. 
 
 
“Plant Safety Operation project activities at JRC IE” was presented by M. Nitoi on 
behalf of C. Bruynooghe. The presentation started with specification of the JRC 
mission to be a trusted provider of science-based policy options to EU policy makers 
to address key challenges facing our society, underpinned by internationally-
recognised research, together with the IE core competences.  
 
An overview on the tasks and structure of the European Commission was given, with 
special emphasis on the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and in particular the Institute for 
Energy (IE), which is one of the 7 institutes of the JRC. In the first part of the 
presentation it were presented very briefly the obligations coming from the Euratom 
treaty and subsequent legislation and how JRC supports other more political general 
Directorates of the EC in their nuclear activities, i.e. nuclear related legislation and 
funding to non-EU member countries to improve the safety of their NPP.  
 
Then the activities of the Safety of Present Nuclear Reactors (SPNR) Unit were 
presented in more detail, as below: 
 
 The European Clearinghouse, which is related to operational experience 
feedback;  
 11 
 The Plant Operation Safety Action (POS), which is related to activities on plant 
operation safety including network activities on AM/LTO and the JRC participation 
to NULIFE, and activities related to the TACIS & PHARE programs.  
 
The participation to DG-RTD programmes and to SNE-TP Industrial Initiative, ENER 
was included in the presentation. It was emphasised the fact that NULIFE document 
issues a list of the top priority targets for Gen II/III – LTO as the following: 
  
 European harmonised plant design and safety justification methodology, 
 Integrity assessment, 
 Ageing mechanisms of Structures-Systems-Components, 
 Ageing monitoring, 
 Prevention and mitigation of ageing, 
 Pre-normative research, codes and standards and 
 Safety issues in instrumentation & control and electrical systems. 
 
The framework of activities and actions related to safety area for unit of “Safety of 
Present Nuclear Reactors” were presented. More specific, the on-going networks 
which operate under POS umbrella (ENIQ, APSA, SENUF) were presented, with their 
main activities.  
 
ENIQ is a Network of 40 organizations, collaborating on Non-Destructive Examination, 
Qualification and Risk Informed In-Service Inspections. It was emphasised that the 
working meetings attract increasingly JRC visibility, and the activity is completely in 
line with the prioritisation of SNE-TP and IAEA. The network operates through 2 
working groups, RI-ISI working group and Qualification WG. 
 
SENUF Network promotes harmonisation on maintenance issues or other engineering 
issues. 15 organizations are member of the Network.  It is intended to introduce in 
TWG a Fire safety specific sub-network, accordingly to Gen II/III of the SNE-TP 
Industrial Initiative. In 2010 the activities were focused on spare part issues, LTO 
organisation and regulation frame. A workshop was organized, with involvement of 
utilities, and having as subject practical application of the NS-G2-10 IAEA safety guide 
on preparation for Periodic Safety Review.  
 
The last part of the presentation was dedicated to on-going research programs and 
activities related to LTO with JRC involvement, mainly the LONGLIFE Project on 
treatment of long term irradiation embrittlement effects in RPV Safety Assessment. 
 
EURATOM FP7 was also part of the presentation, with specification of its objectives: 
 
 Improved knowledge on LTO specific phenomena relevant for European reactors; 
 Assessment and proposed improvements of prediction tools, codes and standards 
and 
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 Elaboration of best practice guidelines on irradiation embrittlement surveillance. 
 
As concluding remarks, were specified the future actions planned to be performed. 
They are dedicated to reinforce the modelling, to continue activities of APSA, ENIQ, 
SENUF, to participate to calls coming from SENTP TWG Gen II/III. 
 
 
“Ageing PSA Network activities” was presented by M. Nitoi, the coordinator of the 
Network. EC JRC Network on Ageing PSA aimed to use the common resources of 
Network participants to identify, develop and demonstrate methods and approaches 
which could help PSA developers and users: 
  
 to promote the use of PSA for ageing management and risk-informed applications 
in LTO; 
 to incorporate the effects of equipment ageing into current PSA models to perform 
engineering analysis; 
 in case where age-dependent PSA could not be applied (absence or non-
adequacy of ageing probabilistic model, lack of data, etc.), to specify and prioritize 
reliability monitoring actions/ approach to assure that potential decreasing of 
reliability of SSC would be identified and corrected in time. 
 
Presentation contained the background motivation to initiate the EC JRC IE project, 
the on-going activities of the Network, the results obtained and also the planned 
activities for the coming year. The possible impact to PSA results were presented, 
with their implications for IE frequencies (contribution from active and passive 
components ageing), for safety systems unavailability (due to ageing failures, failures 
of non-redundant parts, unplanned maintenance), and for common cause failures 
CCF (occurrence of intersystem CCF). As practical implications of ageing effects, 
CDF, Risk Profile and RI factors used as decision criteria in many applications could 
be changed in time, and these changes have to be considered in decision making 
process. The expected results for the network are the following: 
 
 Developed set of feasible approaches/ models, methodological guidelines;  
 Proved feasibility of the proposed approaches/ models; 
 Provided support & training in correct application of the project methodological 
guidelines;  
 Establishment of European best-practice for assessment of ageing effects; 
 World-wide dissemination of project results, leading to a better understanding of 
important issues in modelling of ageing phenomena using PSA models.  
 
The main activities of the Network were presented, with their results and further 
planned activities. Summary of the Network activities was presented, with 
specification of published peer review papers, performed case studies that addressed 
all the tasks from action plan, with their developed reports (Task 3 - INR + JRC -EUR 
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23446 EN, NRSC, Task 4- JRC IE & VVER-440 partners, Task 5 - NRI Rez, Task 6 - 
KKG/SW, Task 7-  IRSN/FR & Statwood Cons./US -EUR22483EN, JSI, JRC IE & 
INPE/RF -EUR23079EN) documents issued for end-user support (Guideline for 
selection of SSC to be considered in Ageing PSA, Guideline for Analysis of Data 
Related to Ageing of NPP Components and Systems). The Training on Advanced 
Time-Dependent Reliability Data Analysis was specified also, with his main sessions. 
The activities dedicated to dissemination of the results were presented. As major 
challenges were specified the following: 
 
 Modelling  the ageing as common-cause failure; 
 Investigation of ageing effects on CCF parameters; 
 Finding suitable data for ageing analysis; 
 Assessment of ageing for passive components (data, approach, age-dependent 
reliability models) and 
 APSA results application (AM, LTO). 
 
The concluding remarks are presented below: 
 
 On system availability level, ageing could induce the modification of system 
success criteria, could increase the Common Cause Failure (CCF) probability for 
highly redundant systems, and could change the list of contributors to overall 
system unavailability. On overall plant level, ageing could induce the modification 
of initiating event frequencies, probability of mitigation of undesired events 
(probability of unavailability for safety systems), the occurrence of inter-systems 
CCF, the dominant sequences, and could change the list of contributors to the 
accident sequences. 
 Practical applications that use the addressing of ageing effects in PSA could be 
related to: 
– prioritization of ageing management issues and LTO activities using APSA 
findings; 
– predictive evaluation of plant safety level, aiding in focusing the resources 
for ageing mitigation where and when is necessary; 
– prioritization of maintenance activities using APSA results. 
 The resulting knowledge from the project running should help PSA developers and 
users to efficiently incorporate the effects of equipment ageing into current PSA 
tools and models, to identify and/ or develop most effective corresponding 
methods, to focus on dominant ageing contributors and components and to 
promote the use of PSA for ageing management and for risk-informed decisions. 
  
 
“Application of Bayesian methods for age-dependent failure analysis” was prepared 
by R. Alzbutas, from Lithuanian Energy Institute. The paper presented the general 
framework for assessment of age-dependent failure analysis in case of ageing 
systems, structures and components. The framework is based on Bayesian approach 
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and its ability to incorporate prior information and on idea that ageing can be 
considered as inducing time-dependent change of systems parameters. Bayesian 
update combines prior knowledge or expectations regarding behaviour of a statistical 
parameter with actual observations of the behaviour. Proposed approach is able to 
deal with sparse and rare failure events as is the case of electrical components, piping 
systems and other systems considered as having high reliability. In case study of 
electrical, instrumentation and control components, the proposed framework was 
applied to analyse age dependencies in failure rate together with treatment of 
uncertainties of age-dependent model selection. Unfortunately, the author was not 
able to sustain the presentation, so M. Nitoi presented the summary of the paper, and 
no discussions were made. The paper was included on the CD and distributed after 
the workshop along with all presentations. 
 
 
B. Lydell, from Scandpower Inc. presented the paper “A-PSA & Analytical Challenges: 
Results and Insights from the Integration of Passive Component Reliability in PSA”. 
The paper was based on practical insights from Piping Reliability Analysis (1994 – 
2010), and had the aim to provide a technical perspective on the investigation of aging 
effects using PSA. The work had initially aimed to validate assumptions/ estimates 
loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) frequency in WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014). The 
steps of the analysis were: 
 
 Create database & evaluate service experience with safety-related piping – 
1970 to date 
 Determine feasibility of augmenting PFM with statistical models of piping 
reliability – foster a deep understanding of the unique reliability attributes & 
influence factors & develop a solid analysis framework. 
 
Data requirements & data quality related to integration of passive component reliability 
in PSA constituted a first part of the presentation. Methods used for Piping Reliability 
Analysis, as practical insights were presented. Early results were specified, as follows: 
 
 Series of Technical Reports (SKI Report 95:58, SKI Report 97:26, SKI Report 
97:32, SKI Report 98:30), 
 Microsoft® ACCESS Database – ‘SKI-PIPE’, 
 Workshops & Seminars organized (1996-98), 
 Planning for continuation as an international cooperative effort to collect and 
evaluate pipe failure data 
o OECD/NEA: OPDE (2002-2011), CODAP (2011-2014), 
o SCAP-SCC (2006-2010). 
 
It was commented that even if there exists a strong statistical basis for estimating 
reliability parameters for degraded states, the following should be taken into account: 
correlation of service experience with pipe population data, correlation of service 
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experience with mitigation practice, detailed considerations of uncertainties (data 
completeness, plant-to-plant piping design differences, modelling), Bayes analysis 
framework, and conditional failure probabilities. 
 
It was mentioned that the major advances made in piping reliability analysis were 
supported by the following issues: a robust pipe failure database, Bayes method for 
uncertainty, Markov model to evaluate integrity management strategies. A robust 
database could be used as a learning tool, for knowledge preservation, or to improve 
the understanding of inspection and mitigation programs and their beneficial impact 
on structural integrity, and as resource for methods development (calibration of 
assumptions, validating results, advancing the state-of-the-art). Some insights about 
Markov model were given during the presentation, as follows: 
 
 Markov Model was originally developed for EPRI RI-ISI Program; 
 Many applications of the model (applied to 26 plant specific RI-ISI programs in 
U.S. and South Africa, applied to PBMR to support new ASME Code development 
for in-service inspections, applied in NUREG-1829 LOCA frequency update, and 
recently applied to LWR to guide efforts to reduce internal flood and HELB 
contributions to CDF); 
 Degradation related parameters estimated from service experience and Bayes 
models are the same as those used for the base failure rates; 
 Test and inspection parameters are estimated using simple and easy approach to 
quantify models. 
 
Related to evaluation of ageing effects using PSA, 2 approaches were presented. The 
basic approach has as requirements: CCIII PSA Model (Integrated all modes, internal 
flooding, fire, external events, seismic, L2) and existence of a Strong Degradation 
Mechanism database. The expected outputs are the results decomposition by 
degradation mechanism/ ageing effect (aging effect assessment on CCDP/CLERP, 
aging factor assessment and projection of aging effect on risk metrics). The advanced 
approach has the same requirements as for the basic approach, plus an enhanced 
PSA Software Platform with ‘AM Module’. The outputs are the same as for ‘Basic’ 
approach, but streamlined & integrated. The steps in assessing the ageing factors 
were specified, as follows: 
 
 development of qualitative data (completeness is essential);  
 performing data screening and assessing existence of trends (cumulative failure 
plots, binned data-by age, test different hypotheses could be used);  
 performing parameter estimation (characterize uncertainties, validate results- 
statistically & qualitatively, determine time dependency -if any);  
 performing data specializations as warranted;  
 assessing impact of past, current & future inspection strategies (e.g., leak 
detection, ISI, RI-ISI) by applying Markov model. 
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Feasibility of using PSA for ageing was highlighted, given the following issues: 
 Unique requirements for data quality & completeness 
 Essential that a Degradation Mechanism knowledgebase ‘co-exists’ with 
database 
 Analyst must be sufficiently trained in Degradation Mechanism assessment 
 Maturity of  PSA model is essential (is necessary to have at least CCII with 
plant-specific internal flooding model that includes HELB consideration, and 
CCF parameter considerations) 
 Consensus guidelines for risk metrics to be used 
 Implementation of ‘Basic’ vs. ‘Advanced’ approach 
 After discussions, it was recommended to be performed an international 
‘benchmark’ exercise for Basic Approach. 
 
It was highlighted the fact that there are major improvements in the treatment of piping 
failure in PRA in the last years. It was concluded that there is essential to have a 
mature PSA model, to have co-existence between Degradation Mechanism 
knowledgebase and database to obtain good reliable results. 
It was specified that collecting & maintaining a sustained and consistent data 
collection effort is resource intensive & time-consuming, but there are significant 
benefits of it, if is desirable to have a robust basis for evaluation of aging effects. It 
was concluded also that a ‘strong’ database fosters a good understanding of aging 
effects, and there exists solid technical basis for assessing aging factors using 
statistical reliability methods. 
 
 
“Overview of recommendations for data and models requirements for passive 
components ageing assessment in PSA” was presented by I. Dinu, from Cernavoda 
NPP. The document intended to make a review regarding typologies, failure 
mechanisms, failure modes, and failure rate calculation methods used when passive 
components are included in current Probabilistic Safety Assessment studies. The 
issue of passive component failure is increasingly important as many power plants are 
confronted with the problem of aging on one side and the necessity of safe and 
reliable long term operation on the other side. This requires the systematic and 
proactive identification of degradation and aging mechanisms of critical passive 
components that are not addressed by normal Preventive Maintenance strategies and 
mitigation of these inherent major problems which will otherwise impact on the plant 
assets. 
 
The failure rate calculation methods for passive components were specified, as below:  
 
Statistical analysis at different time interval – the method implies statistical estimates 
of component failure rates, and is based on data collected from SSC service 
experience, at a given operational moment. The major problem to apply the method 
would be the scarcity of data, because the passive components have only visual and 
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ND inspection, and not PM. A variation of this approach is to augment statistical 
estimates of component failure parameters with models that express the problem in 
terms of a failure rate and a conditional probability for each failure mode of interest, at 
a given time moment.  
 
Physical Modelling - the process of detailed physical modelling requires the governing 
equations for each specific mechanism to be defined. 
 
Bayesian Updating - combines prior knowledge or expectations regarding behaviour 
of a statistical problem with actual physical observations of the behaviour, for a better 
estimate of expected behaviour. By updating the theoretical failure rate estimate 
(known as the “prior”) in this fashion, it is obtained a more accurate failure rate 
prediction (the “posterior”) than either the theoretical prediction or a purely empirical 
prediction based on failure observations. 
 
Markov model - explicitly model the interactions between failure mechanisms that 
produce failures and the inspection, detection and repair strategies that can reduce 
the probability that failures occur, or that cracks or leaks will progress to ruptures 
before being detected and repaired. The model starts with the representation of the 
“piping system” as a set of discrete and mutually exclusive states. At any moment in 
time, the system could change the state in accordance with whatever competing 
processes are appropriate for the plant state. The states refer to various degrees of 
piping system degradation, starting from indications of degradation and progressing to 
leaks and ruptures. The change of state is given by the various failure mechanisms 
and could imply the inspection and repair activity performed before progression into 
rupture. This method was found as meeting the requirements of an up-to-date 
analysis of piping reliability, some of these requirements being to: 
  
 account for statistical evidence and engineering insights of plant experience; 
 evaluate the impact of changes in the In Service Inspection strategy, like adding or 
removing of the locations to the existing ISI program or even changing from fixed 
to randomly selected locations from one inspection interval to another; 
 address uncertainties in the reliability assessment and account for it in estimating 
pipe ruptures and in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release 
Frequency (LERF).  
 
The method was applied for piping system, but the basic approach can be applied to 
any passive component for which enough inspection and findings are provided during 
its operational life. It was specified that CNE Cernavoda is participating to a number of 
international initiatives related to ageing management of NPP, as well as cooperative 
projects. One of these projects is the COG joint project “RI-ISI Pilot Study” – where 
the objective is to adapt and apply the EPRI risk informed in-service inspection 
methodology to several systems at a COG identified site. The methodology that is 
adapted and will be specific to COG fleet of nuclear facilities refer to a series of 
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specific systems: PHT, SDCS, ECCS, Main Steam. Results obtained will be 
documented in a final report: 
  
 Fuel Channel R&D program managed by COG  focusing on addressing the 
current operational need to improve confidence in the fitness for service of 
CANDU pressure tubes and developing industry standards for pressure tube 
integrity; 
 Ageing PSA – current project, containing several investigation areas of effects of 
ageing into Probabilistic Safety Assessment studies; 
 Some passive components considered in CNE Cernavoda PSA, like Heat 
Exchangers, were summarized, in the perspective of methods, failure modes, 
failure mechanisms, and ageing considerations. 
 The modern PSA analysis and Risk Informed In-Service Inspection strategies 
implemented intend to answer to questions related to: 
– time evolution of failure rate, considering the current maintenance 
practices; 
– mitigating actions to be taken in order to account for reliability deterioration 
in time; 
– effects of these actions over the failure rate and over the CDF/ LERF. 
 
 
G. Petkov, from Technical University of Sofia presented the paper “A Case Study on 
Incorporation of Ageing Effects into the PSA Model of NPP with VVER1000”. 
 
The paper presented the results of a case study on incorporation of ageing effects into 
the PSA model of the Russian PWR - WWER-1000, study that was carried out within 
the framework of the EC-JRC Ageing PSA Network Task 7. The ageing impact was 
presented, first on the plant level (effect visible by CDF changing, risk profile -
contribution of initiating event groups to the CDF, list of the dominant minimal cut sets 
MCS, results of SSC prioritization due to ageing), and after, on the system level 
(effects related to reliability/ availability, list of the dominant MCS, results of SSC 
prioritization due to ageing) and on the component level – appropriate mathematical 
models within existing computer codes for reliability and risk assessment. 
 
Basic model for ageing model include mathematical parameters, for which it is 
possible to obtain appropriate data, however the PSA software do not use such 
parameters. This makes these models more difficult for ageing incorporation into the 
PSA, modelled by current software as Risk Spectrum (RS), and their use should not 
be widely applicable. The difference between age and time was presented, 
considering that ageing of the component does not proceed at the same speed as 
time. Also the age generally incorporates the effect of the surveillance, maintenance, 
and replacement of the subcomponent or whole component, while the time 
incorporates non-ageing (accelerated, sudden and unexpected) degradation as well. 
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The approaches that can be used to incorporate the ageing effects into PSA models 
are summarized below: 
 
Minimal Cut Sets Modification Approach includes simple modification of the previous 
MCS by addition of the ageing contribution to the new MCS. The procedure consists 
of two steps: 
 
 reliability database update, 
 MCS recalculation. 
 
However, this procedure missed all changes of the PSA/ system reliability models due 
to creation of new BE because of passive equipment ageing or replacement during 
reconstruction and modernization. Therefore, some ageing contributions are missed, 
and this first procedure was considered not appropriate. 
 
Step-wise approach consists of extension of the existing PSA and reliability models 
with addition of ageing as an independent contribution. The deficiency of such 
approach is the fact that contribution of ageing may not be independent from the 
already considered contribution to failure. 
 
 Age-dependent degradation - passive SSC, not included in the initial PSA 
model; 
 Age-independent degradation - active SSC, included in the initial PSA model. 
 
If the dependence is important, such approach is not appropriate to be used. As 
output of the procedure it is possible to obtain: 
  
 CDF/ risk/ reliability/ availability profile, 
 list of the dominant MCS, 
 results of SSC prioritization due to ageing. 
 
The SSC prioritization for consideration of ageing was done in four iterative steps: 
extension of the SSC (components) included into the existing models (if L<M<N), 
extension of the SSC failure modes included into existing models, updating of the 
SSC reliability data and performing SSC ageing sensitivity study. 
 
Interface between PSA Software and Ageing Reliability Parameters Specification was 
evaluated, taking into account the following aspects: 
 
 The PSA models are updated periodically and taking into account the ageing that 
affect the reliability of one or more SSC. 
 The regulators urge plant operators to update and calculate more frequently risk 
models in order to check, catch and incorporate as well degradation as ageing 
processes. 
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 The methods for age-dependent reliability parameters specification include 
mathematical parameters, for which is possible to obtain appropriate data. 
 
It was concluded that the parameters of ageing cannot be included directly to the 
probabilistic models within the existing computer codes for PSA, because for this 
purpose the codes have to possess the integrated capabilities for calculations with 
consideration of ageing into the PSA models. Alternatively, the ageing contribution 
can be calculated outside of the PSA computer code and the evaluated contributions 
of ageing could be inserted after into the PSA models. At each selected time interval, 
the average failure rates or failure probabilities are updated for the equipment under 
investigation and the evaluation of the PSA is performed with insertion of calculated 
average probabilities into the PSA model. 
 
An advantage of this method is that it can be used in standard PSA, and the PSA 
database could be updated for any ageing equipment and any year of interest. 
However, the PSA software developers do not recommend change the data locally 
because it is dangerous without a seamless interface between PSA software 
modules, and it involves unreasonable long time spent for updating boundary 
condition sets in PSA models. 
 
Risk spectrum was used to recalculate the failure rate/ unavailability of all components 
with different ages (for each failure modes), in different plant operating states with 
different boundary conditions and for many time/ age points of the unit, to monitor the 
NPP ageing. This made the application of the methods quite cumbersome and tedious 
for ageing incorporation into the PSA models, and therefore, their use are practical 
just for case studies with limited applicability. 
  
Another part of the presentation was dedicated to R-DAT, which is a Reliability Data 
Analysis update tool (it uses generic and installation specific reliability data). The 
background for developing R-DAT was specified, as it provides Bayesian analysis 
capabilities needed in support of risk and reliability assessment of complex systems, 
and is intended to give common interface between RS products. The idea to develop 
a seamless interface of RS with the simple and basic software for database support 
was taking into account by RS developers, and they added a new feature to the new 
version of the RS PSA – module R-DAT and MS Excel Import and Export feature. 
Two new developing features of Risk Spectrum that could be used for taking into 
account ageing dependency are: correlation between parameters and success block 
diagrams. 
 
The last part of the presentation was dedicated to presentation of the case study. The 
discussion on the sensitive use of PSA to evaluate the SSC ageing effects on the 
overall plant safety was provided using the WWER-1000 large LOCA PSA model as 
an example. The ageing data included time-dependent reliability models for certain 
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mechanical, electrical and instrumentation & control components. Event tree model 
developed took into account the following factors: 
 
 operational state: power operation and hot shutdown, 
 brake location (100<Dy≤850mm): hot legs or cold legs. 
 
The procedure of modifying the existed PSA reference model was presented, as 
including the following seven steps: 
 
1. Step 1: Identification of BE which correspond to the components sensitive to 
ageing – by importance measure calculation (FV, FC, RDF and RIF) for which 
age-dependent reliability data are available. 
2. Step 2: Creation of House Events for the same model with three different 
databases to trigger the analysis cases and activate the exchange events for 
each particular age point where the CDF calculation has to be done (for case 
study purposes were considered age points of 8, 14 and 20 years of operation). 
3. Step 3: Specification of 4 exchange events for each BE identified on the Step 
1, each exchange event corresponds to the component unavailability at the 
time point 8, 14 and 20 years in operation and it’s linked to the corresponded 
house events; Optionally it is possible to specify large groups of exchange 
events by tagged BE. 
4. Step 4: Determination of attributes for created exchange events taking into 
account failure mode, operating state, unit age considered for calculation, test 
and maintenance strategy, type and parameters of reliability model; 
5. Step 5: Specification of the parameters (failure rate and probability), linking 
them to the exchange events and input the initial values for the point 
estimations and distribution functions. 
6. Step 6: Creation of a correspondent CCF group for each exchange event in 
case when initial BE is considered for the CCF group; the CCF model 
parameters (e.g. β-factors or MGL) remain the same in the CCF group 
modelling. CCF failure probability, then, changed with the unit age 
proportionally to the changes in a probability of independent failure. 
7. Step 7: Quantification of the CDF for a particular age point as soon as all 
modifications for all identified components and BE are made; for each analysis 
case in a Boundary Condition Set specification the corresponding House 
Event was set up to “true”. 
 
Depending of the purpose of the calculation the following risk measures could be 
quantified:  
 CDF changing as a function of unit age, 
 modification of risk profile (contribution of IE groups to the CDF) as a function 
of unit age, 
 modification of the list of the dominant MCS, 
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 changing in risk importance measures (Risk Increasing Factor, Risk 
Decreasing Factor, etc.). 
 
The total change of CDF for Large LOCA in POS0 (full power operation) for the last 
six years of operation (considered value for 20 and 14 years) was calculated as 
ΔCDFLLOCA=CDF20 years-CDF14 years, and the obtained value confirms that large 
scale modernization on the both of Kozloduy NPP units succeeds to prevent the SSC 
ageing processes and to reduce the overall plant risk. 
 
Concluding remarks: 
The results obtained gave evidence that the ageing contributors should be treated 
distinctively on the basis of importance measures, system unavailability, dominant 
accident sequences and IE CDF portions in the overall plant risk (total CDF).  
Considering sensitive incorporation of ageing effects into PSA models can help in the 
selection, prioritization of SSC susceptible to ageing, improving maintenance 
measures, replacing important components and performing consistent ageing 
management as a part of a risk-informed decision-making process. 
The methods for age-dependent reliability parameters specification included 
mathematical parameters, for which is possible to obtain appropriate data, however, 
the estimated ageing parameters cannot be included directly in the probabilistic 
models within the existing computer codes for PSA.  
The codes have to possess the integrated capabilities for calculations of ageing 
considerations. New modules and features of the most popular PSA software 
RiskSpectrum as R-DAT, Excel Import and Export, correlation between parameters 
and success block diagrams could be very useful for preparing extended ageing 
reliability database and successful incorporation of ageing effects into the PSA 
models. 
 
 
J. Kluegel  presented the paper “Activities of NPP Gösgen in the field of Ageing PSA”. 
Applications and applied research activities at NPP Gösgen are related to: 
probabilistic safety indicators, time-trend analysis (active components), pipe rupture 
frequency (Markov models), probabilistic lifetime assessment (fatigue evaluation). The 
fact that NPP Gösgen has an unlimited operational license was specified, together 
with the fact that ageing effects are permanently monitored, using a large investment 
program for replacement in-time of passive components in order to avoid undue risks 
and to convince plant owners that safety goals are maintained. Regulatory 
requirement for the plant is: „No risk increase with ageing“. PSA results are used to 
assess the technical risks, with link to financial risks (production loss). 
  
The ageing management (AM) program is based on deterministic criteria; it covers all 
safety classified equipment, components and structures and its efficiency needs to be 
assessed. The NPP Gösgen established a system of probabilistic safety indicators 
before the introduction of regulatory requirements: global indicators (annual risk profile, 
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evaluation of risk peaks), detailed indicators (unavailability on demand of safety 
important systems), probabilistic cost-benefit analysis. 
 
The activities where PSA results are successfully used were presented: 
 
 Scheduled on-line maintenance at Gösgen is permitted due to the deterministic 
design (6*100%), and improved configuration control is established to avoid 
inadvertent maintenance, with the following criteria: 
 
– no risk peaks with a CCDF above 1.E-5/y; 
– CCDF for scheduled maintenance plus assumed forced repair (over 24h) 
should remain below 5.E-5/y and the overall contribution (under this 
assumption) shall not exceed 25% of the zero-maintenance cumulative 
core damage frequency; 
– the contribution to the annual cumulative core damage frequency due to 
maintenance should remain below 5.E-7/y ( regulatory requirement A06). 
 
 Technical departments get „acceptable time windows“ for online maintenance: 
 
– 25% of AOT (repair time) can be used for preventive online maintenance 
activities. 
– Additionally, train revisions (a single redundancy) can be performed once a 
year.  
– Work is only allowed in a single redundancy. 
 
The process is controlled by plant operations (on-line, just in time) and by the annual 
event analysis and the procedure assures low risk profiles and acceptable 
maintenance times. 
 
The developed procedure for performing trend analysis of the APSA network was 
implemented at NPP Gösgen and introduced as part of the Periodic Safety Review 
(2008) as follows: 
 
 Prediction of CDF for the end of lifetime was made, observing a small reduction 
due to ongoing learning effects (DFR), and with inclusion of a check  for “passive” 
components (LOCA frequency). 
 Assessment of LOCA frequency was performed (comparison with LOCA-
frequencies obtained by a Bayesian method and with data used in Gösgen PSA), 
together with the development of a Plant Specific Piping Failure Database as part 
of participation in the OPDE project (via regulatory body). As a result a more 
detailed database following mainly the structure of OPDE was created. 
 Development of a Markov model using plant specific information from in-service 
inspections. 
 Quantification and investigation of alternate inspection practices. 
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All reportable incidents are evaluated by the help of PSA, and the results support the 
identification of the “true safety significance of events”, and the classification of the 
events (Swiss “INES” classification depends on the results of risk evaluation). 
 
A new project, Probabilistic Assessment of Plant Lifetime was presented, with the 
motivation for initiating it and with expected results. Lifetime of a nuclear power plant 
is driven by the lifetime of the most vulnerable components/ structures that cannot be 
the subject of replacement (Reactor vessel and internals, critical piping, large 
components -pressurizer, steam generators). Besides irradiation, different modes of 
fatigue mechanism (including environmental factors) are driving the lifetime. 
Knowledge of lifetime allows to prepare replacement programs in cases there such 
replacement is feasible and needed. Longevity curves are defined as the conditional 
probability of failure of a component in dependence of age. A model similar to the 
traditional fragility function model in seismic PSA would be applied (double-lognormal) 
The idea was to characterize the plant lifetime as the minimal HCLPF of the lifetime 
distributions of critical components. Gösgen NPP offers a three-month internship for 
this project. 
 
 
“Verification of ageing trends by screening of safety significant operational events 
database” was presented by A. Rodionov, from IRSN. The presented study 
investigated reportable events caused by ageing of SSC in France and Germany, 
using the IRSN and GRS event databases. The used methodology was composed by 
three steps: 
 
1. selection of events (screening of the database with keywords and selection of 
relevant events), 
2. classification of selected events by groups and statistical analysis, 
3. summary of lessons learnt (conclusions and recommendations). 
 
303 events were selected as ageing related, from 11972 events reported, during the 
period from 01 January 1990 to 30 June 2010. As examples for ageing-related events 
the following were specified: 
 
 Primary coolant leak incidents caused by thermal fatigue,  
 Pneumatic control valves failures on the relief valves to atmosphere, 
 Ageing-related malfunction of circuit breakers,  
 Formation of whiskers on circuit boards used in I&C  
 
The results were presented in categories of components, components from primary 
circuit, mechanical components, electrical and instrumentation & control components 
(number of events, contribution of degradation mechanisms were specified for each 
group). The report will be issued as an EUR report next year. There were questions 
related to the ranking of AM that leads to failure, difficult to be made due to lack of 
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clear information. Discussions were related to the possibility of issuing 
recommendations for improving the event reporting system.  
 
 
K. Dusko, from Jozef Stefan Institute, presented the paper “Age-dependent 
unavailability modelling of safety systems integrating effects of test and maintenance”. 
Activities connected with the age-dependent PSA of NPP included the following: 
 
 Modelling of ageing of passive systems, structures and components (NUREG/CR-
5632); 
 quantification of the ageing induced risk using PSA (NUREG/CR-5510, 
NUREG/CR-5378); 
 ageing-related failure analysis of NPP operational data (NUREG/CR-4747, 
NUREG/CR-5248). 
 
The objectives of APSA activities at JSI were specified as being: 
  
 to examine the options for direct and separate inclusion of ageing in PSA in order 
to compare the effectiveness of the models and the applicability of the results; 
 to develop an analytical age-dependent unavailability model, that would overcome 
the limitations of FTA; 
 to conduct trade-off analysis between system unavailability and T&M costs; 
 to assess the implications of ageing data uncertainties on the system unavailability 
calculations using the developed analytical unavailability model. 
 
Two main options for consideration of ageing in PSA were considered: method of 
stepwise constant failure rates and method of prioritization of components due to 
ageing using the PSA results. Due to limited parameter options in risk spectrum, the 
method of stepwise constant failure rates was utilized and calculations were made for 
three different time points. 
 
The effects of ageing were presented separately at component, system and plant 
level. The details are given below: 
 
 Ageing consideration at component level: 
– Containment Spray System (CSS) selected as an example; 
– 11 parameters representing the selected components considered; 
– results indicate that some equipment can be non-important, if no ageing is 
considered, and very important if ageing is considered and vice versa; 
– risk factors may considerably vary depending on ageing consideration.   
 Ageing consideration at system level (CSS): 
– FT model comprised of 24 BE and 22 gates; 
– results show the increase of system unavailability with one order of magnitude 
for the considered period of 15 years; 
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– FV changed between 11% and 2 orders of magnitude; 
– RDF changed between 0% - 97%; 
– RIF changed between 2% - 90%; 
 Ageing consideration in all PSA model (at plant level): 
– Model comprised of thousandths of gates, thousandths of BE, hundredths of 
FT and 16 ET with 16 IE; 
– IE frequencies were changed (due to ageing) for two groups of IE 
– The linear method for consideration of ageing was implemented; 
 Results of prioritization of components due to ageing indicate the following: 
– the increases of CDF are relatively large; 
– it is questionable how those large increases of CDF are comparable to 
changes due to other parameter changes ; 
– more experience and analyses are needed to confirm or reject the applicability 
of the method for prioritization of components due to ageing based on the 
results of PSA in the real application of the results. 
 
It was concluded that the contribution of ageing seems to be an interesting issue for 
modelling and quantification. Sensitivity calculations were performed for specific BE 
(MDP and MOV failure) of the FT model (QTOP – HPSIS failure probability). 
 
Related to ageing impact on components, it was observed that if sequential is 
replaced by staggered testing, relatively high reduction in Qsys is observed. The 
impact of the component ageing data uncertainty on system unavailability calculations 
was performed via: 
 
 age-dependent unavailability model considering T&M; 
 A Monte Carlo simulation-based computer code; 
 RiskSpectrum software. 
 
It was observed that the uncertainty of system unavailability is rising with the 
extension of the test interval (Ti_opt -> Ti_TS ). After discussions, it was concluded 
that the “more complex” the system is, the higher the ageing impact becomes; and if 
large uncertainties are associated with the ageing parameters, they have a substantial 
impact on the quantitative results. Discussions highlighted the necessity of developing 
an analytical unavailability model that simultaneously integrates: 
 
 the impact of T&M activities, 
 testing strategies (sequential vs. staggered), 
 component ageing. 
 
 
S. Poghosyan, from Nuclear & Radiation Safety Center, presented the paper “Time-
dependent reliability assessment for VVER equipment”. The aim of the investigation 
performed was to address T-D aspects in reliability calculations for critical VVER 
 27 
equipment in order to estimate the degree of ageing influence on component 
reliability. Medzamor NPP Unit 2 was used as an example, and the Guidelines for 
Analysis of Data Related to Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components and Systems 
(EUR 23954 EN) were used as a base for data processing. Selection of components 
for further consideration was done using risk importance parameters: 
 
 Fussel-Vesely importance (F-V) 
– Provides current contribution of SSC to overall risk 
– Selection criteria: F-V > 0.005 
 Risk increase factor (RIF) 
– Shows potential importance of SSC, given that SSC failed 
– Selection criteria: RIF > 1E+2. 
 
Newly installed SSC were screened out from the model. This includes essential 
service water system, fast steam isolation valves, Diesel-driven feedwater system and 
reverse motor generators. WinBUGS was used for data processing, and the following 
models were verified: 
 
 For Poisson model (failure rate) 
– constant model 
– loglinear model  
– power model  
 For Binominal model (probability of failures on demand) 
– constant model 
– log-log model - ln(-ln(1–p(t)) = θ1 + θ2t  
– logit model - ln (p(t)/(1 – p(t))) = θ1 + θ2t  
– probit model - Φ-1(p(t)) = θ1 + θ2t, where Φ-1(p(t)) - the inverse function of 
cumulative normal distribution  
 
Best-fit model was found based on p-value (=0.5). 
 
T-D reliability data analysis showed the existence of an increasing trend for some 
components. A decreasing trend was observed for other components and the 
constant model was applied. Some interesting issues were observed during the 
analysis. DG failures recorded at VVER shows that sometimes it is difficult to clarify 
applicable failure modes (fail to start, fail to run) and it was concluded that the 
uncertainties in root cause analysis could lead to inadequate interpretation of ageing-
trend analysis for DG reliability parameters. Sensitivity study was performed in order 
to verify used assumptions (sensitivity study was done by combining statistics of both 
failure modes). Reprocessing of combined data revealed that the best fitted model is a 
loglinear model with p-value equals 0.13. Incorporation of ageing/ T-D aspects in 
reliability models will allow prediction of risk profile, hence to enhance efficiency of 
safety-related decision making on equipment resource assessment, in ageing 
management programs and safety-related modernizations strategy. 
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It was concluded that VVER-specific database development is necessary, and in this 
respect, activities were initiated at IAEA (database interface is ready), and some data 
were collected and used during case study for Task 4. It was concluded that the 
guideline (EUR 23954 EN) is detailed and can be used for data processing, but it 
requires some additional information. Following issues of EUR 23954 EN guideline 
should be detailed: 
  
 criteria for acceptable p-values, 
 information/ decision making procedure for poor fitting cases. 
 
For T-D / ageing trend analysis it is required to have detailed information on observed 
failures, and it is also important to take into account the so called “burn-in” failures. 
 
An interesting plant tour was organized in the afternoon of November, 10, for the 
workshop participants. The information center of Gösgen NPP is a very modern one, 
providing all the necessary information in an interactive and attractive way.  
 
2.2 General Conclusions 
 
The workshop demonstrates the level of interest and progress with Ageing PSA 
development in each organization. It could be stated that there is a variety of topics 
under development as well as a level of details in presented results. Based on the 
presentations and participants experience, there were discussions about topics 
considered interesting for further development. The most interesting conclusions are 
presented below: 
 
Many participants would like to see more practical oriented results and examples, in 
particular, the links with maintenance practice and reliability data analysis and 
applications of the results. Also it would be good to develop similar evaluations with 
active components, regarding the ageing of passive components. In order to perform 
age dependent reliability assessments, current PSA reliability data are not enough 
and need to be completed by additional data categories. Collection and processing 
additional data is time and resource consuming process, and to reduce the cost of 
data collection, this process has to be improved on multipurpose bases. 
 
In most of the countries the assumption about constant failure rate is taken without 
validation, probably due also to the fact that performing such validation, additional 
amount of data are required. Possible approaches and methods for validation are 
proposed in the guideline on reliability parameters estimation, together with 
identification of the potential difficulties related to the data interpretation (model 
checking, assumption on renewal process, etc.). Gösgen NPP PSA team uses the 
trend analysis from 2008. The recommendation of Dr. Klugel was to perform a trend 
assessment using specific data with 10 years periodicity. 
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Assessment of passive components ageing was debated intensively among the 
participants, and discussions included the types of criteria to be considered when 
deciding an inclusion of a passive component in PSA, as follows: 
  
 passive components considered in Periodic Inspection Program or In Service 
Inspection Program should be considered; 
 evidence of passive components failures from the specific utility or from similar 
plants (this involve the searching of events in the internal plant database, from 
processes like reports of abnormal conditions, plant work requests, operator logs 
and other internal sources) 
 expert judgments comprised in technical documents issued by NRC, EPRI, IAEA 
and their applicability. 
 
It was agreed that passive components have the effect to create an IE much more 
likely than adding a failure to unavailability of components. It was concluded that 
AFMEA could be used to decide if the AM is really important, and how large the effect 
can be (hybrid model, empiric model), and SAFIRE could be used for calculation of 
rupture failure for piping. Physical modelling could be used in the assessment of 
passive components, assuming the uncertainties with Monte Carlo analysis, but their 
modelling in PSA could be difficult (in case of I&C system). 
 
For further development it was considered interesting to discuss different approach 
that could be used to assess and model the ageing of passive components, and the 
difference between them (after comparing). Related to activities dedicated to 
incorporation of Age-Depended Reliability Parameters and Data into PSA Models, it 
was remarked that many case studies were dedicated to this activity, wishing to 
demonstrate possible ways to incorporate ageing effects (time-dependent reliability 
models) into PSA, and using mainly the stepwise failure rate approach for 
implementation of these effects in the model. It was suggested as appropriate to 
initiate actions to improve the software, to make it suitable for ageing evaluations – 
issuing recommendations based on the case studies results and insights could be the 
next step. 
 
It was concluded also that the incorporation of ageing effects into PSA models can 
help in the selection, prioritization of SSC susceptible to ageing, improving 
maintenance measures, replacing important components and performing consistent 
ageing management as a part of a risk-informed decision-making process. The ageing 
contributors should be treated distinctively on the basis of importance measures, 
system unavailability, dominant accident sequences and risk profile.  
 
At the end of the workshop, M. Nitoi expressed her gratitude for the host of the event, 
for organizing the workshop in such a good way. She also thanked the participants for 
taking the time to attend the meeting, to prepare the presentations and to engage in 
the discussions. The evaluation round table, plus the comments made by the 
 30 
participants indicate that the workshop has been a success, not only regarding the 
very interesting technical programme, but also regarding the premises and hospitality. 
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APPENDIX A: Workshop Agenda 
 
9th November 2010: 
 
9:00 – 9:30 Opening of the Workshop. Introductions and welcome greetings 
9:30 – 9:50 Jens Kluegel - Welcome at the plant site. Introduction of Gösgen 
NPP activities 
9:50 – 10:30 Christiane Bruynooghe – Plant Safety Operation project activities at 
JRC IE 
10:30 – 11:00 Coffee break  
11:00 – 11:40 Mirela Nitoi – Ageing PSA Network activities 
11:40 – 12:20 Irina Kuzmina – Overview of IAEA Activities and Recent Publications 
Relating to Safety Assessment 
12:20 – 13:00 Robertas Alzbutas - Application of Bayesian methods for age-
dependent failure analysis 
13:00 – 14:00 Lunch 
14:00 – 14:40 Bengt Lydell - A-PSA & Analytical Challenges: Results and Insights 
from the Integration of Passive Component Reliability in PSA 
14:40 – 15:20 Irina Dinu - Overview of recommendations for data and models 
requirements for passive components ageing assessment in PSA 
15:20 – 15:50 Coffee break  
15:50 – 16:30 Alexander Getman – Reliability of the NPP mechanical components 
and optimization of their lifetime management  - probabilistic 
approach  
16:30 – 17:10 Guergui Petkov - A Case Study on Incorporation of Ageing Effects 
into the PSA Model of NPP with VVER1000 
 
 
10th November 2010: 
 
9:00 – 9:40 J. Kluegel - Activities of NPP Gösgen in the field of Ageing PSA 
9:40 – 10:20 A. Rodionov – Verification of ageing trends by screening of safety 
significant operational events database 
10:20 – 10:50 Coffee break 
10:50 – 11:30 Kancev Dusko - Age-dependent unavailability modelling of safety 
systems integrating effects of test and maintenance 
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11:30 – 12:10 Shahen Poghosyan - Time-dependent reliability assessment for 
VVER equipment  
12:10 – 12:30 Discussion & closure of workshop 
12:30 – 13:30 Lunch  
13:30 Technical visit to Gösgen-Däniken NPP (2 groups) 
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APPENDIX B: List of Participants 
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APPENDIX C: List of Acronyms 
 
AMP   Accident Management Program 
CCDF   Conditional Core Damage Frequency 
LTO   Long Term Operation  
PLiM   Plant Life Management 
EC   European Commission  
JRC   Joint Research Centre 
IET   Institute for Energy and Transport  
PSA   Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
CCF   Common Case Failures 
PRIS   Power Reactor Information System 
NPP   Nuclear Power Plant  
APSA   Ageing Probabilistic Safety Assessment Network 
MCS   Minimal Cut Sets  
NSNI   Division of Nuclear Installation Safety 
RAMP   Review of accident management program 
SAET   Safety assessment education and training program 
SG   Safety guides  
SAM   Severe Accidents Management  
DM   Degradation Mechanism  
CDF   Core Damage Frequency 
LERF   Large Early Release Frequency 
RI-ISI   Risk Informed In Service Inspection  
SSC   Structures, systems and components 
R-DAT  Reliability Data Analysis 
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